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THE HONORABLE DEANELL REECE TACHAt
INTRODUCTION
The Denver University Law Review asked me to provide an over-
view of the Tenth Circuit's work during the survey period, September
2001 through August 2002. The Tenth Circuit's case docket is as diverse
as the twelve circuit judges and seven senior judges who handle our
workload, and reflects the rich geographic and cultural assets of the cir-
cuit. We hear appeals from eight district courts throughout our six-state
region,' in addition to cases that originated in the United States Bank-
ruptcy Court, the United States Tax Court, and various federal adminis-
trative agencies.
During the survey period, litigants initiated 2,616 appeals in the
Tenth Circuit.2 Of this total, nearly one-third involved habeas corpus
petitions or civil rights suits brought by state and federal prisoners. The
following table provides a percentage breakdown of all Tenth Circuit
cases by type:
3
Type of Case Percentage of Total
Criminal 17.7
United States Civil (Civil suits in 8.7
which the U.S. is a party)
t Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; B.A., University of
Kansas, 1968; J.D., University of Michigan, 1971.
1. The states within the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit are Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Kansas.
2. See E-mail from Regi Aichlmayr, UNIX/Web Systems Specialist, United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, to Greg Deis, Judicial Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit (Jan. 23, 2003) (copy on file with the Denver University Law Review).
3. Id.
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Private Civil 27.9
Prisoner Habeas Corpus Petitions 15.4
(other than § 2254 and § 2255
petitions)
Prisoner Habeas Corpus Petitions 5.4
Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and
2255
Prisoner Civil Rights Suits (state 11.5
and federal prisoners)





During 2001, 4 the Tenth Circuit decided 2,792 appeals. 5 Of this to-
tal, 34% were decided after oral argument, while the remaining cases
were disposed of without oral argument.6 These percentages closely track
the national average for the circuit courts throughout the United States.7
4. Numbers for the survey period were unavailable for this article.
5. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRcUIT, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT
(2001) (on file with author).
6. Id.
7. In 2001, the national averages for cases decided with oral argument and without oral
argument were 32% and 67%, respectively. Id.
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RECENT TENTH CIRCuIT DECISIONS
A. Overview
The Tenth Circuit cases highlighted in this survey cover a broad
spectrum of issues, ranging from qui tam actions filed under the False
Claims Act8 to First Amendment freedoms in the public-school setting. 9
In the following section, I briefly discuss these cases, while the case
comments in this issue provide a more thorough analysis.
In reviewing these decisions, one overarching theme emerges: the
federal courts function within a governmental construct based on several
"first principles,'" structural elements embodied in the Constitution and
undergirding our system of government. These first principles permeate
much of the Tenth Circuit's work, as illustrated by the cases that are re-
viewed in this issue.
The first among these fundamental principles is federalism. Federal
courts are vested with the vital role of demarcating the proper spheres of
authority assigned to the dual sovereigns in our federalist system. Feder-
alism ideals emphasize the importance of placing many aspects of gov-
ernment closer to the people, increasing political accountability, while
serving to enfranchise the citizenry, and thereby promoting individual
liberty. As the Supreme Court has stated, "[T]he Constitution divides
authority between federal and state governments for the protection of
individuals. State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: 'Rather, federal-
ism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sov-
ereign power.""'
Second, within the federal government, the judiciary is but one of
three co-equal branches of government, and the federal courts must ob-
serve the boundaries set forth in the first three articles of the Constitu-
tion, while delineating these boundaries in specific cases. This diffusion
of power functions to promote individual liberty, reinforcing the values
underlying federalism principles. As James Madison noted in Federalist
No. 51:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the
people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then
the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the peo-
8. See United States ex rel. Holmes v. Consumer Ins. Group, 279 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2002).
9. See Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002).
10. Deanell Reece Tacha, The Federal Courts in the 21st Century, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 7, 9
(1999).
11. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
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pie. The different governments will control each other, at the same
time that each will be controlled by itself.1
2
Similarly, within the federal court system, we as appellate courts
must adhere to the limited role bestowed upon us, respecting the primary
role of the federal district courts in certain regards.
Finally, and most importantly, federal courts exist to protect indi-
vidual sovereignty, the ideal embodied in the preamble to our Constitu-
tion, which reminds us: "We the People of the United States ...or-
dain[ed] and establish[ed] this Constitution for the United States of
America."' 3 The concept of individual sovereignty is primary among
these fundamental principles, as it is the purpose for which the other two
principles function.
Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of
the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of exces-
sive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between
the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny
and abuse from either front.... In the tension between federal and
state power lies the promise of [individual] liberty.
14
Thus, in the end, all three first principles converge into one over-
arching tenet: the primacy of individual liberty. In order to accord proper
protection to this basic precept that underlies our entire system of gov-
ernment, it is important to recognize the many contexts in which these
first principles manifest themselves. The cases discussed in this issue
illustrate this point, highlighting the essential functions performed by the
Tenth Circuit and other federal courts.
B. Our Federalist System
I begin with federalism. Three cases touch on this first principle,
Fleming v. Jefferson County School District R-J,1-5 a First Amendment
case, and two habeas corpus cases, Herrera v. Lemaster16 and Johnson v.
McKune.'7
In Fleming, we held that school-sponsored speech need not be
viewpoint neutral18 under the Supreme Court's decision in HazelwoodSchool District v. Kuhlmeier,19 so long as the school's actions further
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 161 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1966).
13. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
14. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1991).
15. 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002).
16. 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2002).
17. 288 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2002).
18. Fleming, 298 F.3d at 926.
19. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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legitimate pedagogical interests.20 In reaching this holding, the court af-
forded substantial deference to the local educators' stated educational
concerns.2' We stressed that such deference and restraint was appropri-
ate, in light of the fact that "[b]y and large, public education in our Na-
tion is committed to the control of state and local authorities.
' 2
Federalism and comity principles were also at the forefront in two
habeas corpus cases before the Tenth Circuit. In Herrera, we held that a
federal court on habeas corpus review must apply harmless-error analy-
sis,23 even when a state court decision is contrary to or involves an un-
reasonable application of controlling Supreme Court authority.24 This
holding furthers the concerns articulated by the Supreme Court in Brecht
v. Abrahamson:25 (1) the State's primacy in defining and enforcing
criminal laws; (2) the State's interest in the finality of criminal convic-
tions; and (3) respect for state court sovereignty, specifically, the state
court's "initial responsibility for vindicating constitutional rights [in state
criminal trials]. ''26
The court echoed these themes in Johnson.27 In considering the ret-
28
roactivity of the constitutional rule set forth in Sandstrom v. Montana,
we stressed that "the intrusiveness and the inordinate and overwhelming
burden that widespread retroactivity would have on the states' judicial
resources," and the understandable frustration of state courts "when they
faithfully apply existing constitutional law only to have a federal court
discover, during a [habeas] proceeding, new constitutional commands. 29
Based on these considerations, we held that the Sandstrom rule did not
30apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.
20. Fleming, 298 F.3d at 934.
21. Id. at 925.
22. Id. at 925 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting West v. Derby Unified Sch.
Dist., 206 F.3d 1358, 1363 (10th Cir. 2000)).
23. Herrera, 301 F.3d at 1200. We also reinforced the Supreme Court's holding in Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993), that a federal court on habeas corpus review must apply the
more relaxed harmless-error standard under Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946), as
compared to the more rigorous standard applicable on direct review under Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). Herrera, 301 F.3d at 1200.
24. Herrera, 301 F.3d at 1200. Although this was clearly the state of the law prior to 1996,
the defendant in Herrera argued that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act displaced
prior law and made harmless-error analysis inappropriate where the state court decision was contrary
to clearly established law. Id. at 1194-95.
25. 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
26. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 635.
27. Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1195.
28. 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979) (holding that a jury instruction-that the law presumes an
individual intends the ordinary consequences of her actions-which a jury may have interpreted as a
conclusive presumption or as shifting the burden of persuasion, was unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
29. Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1195 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989)).
30. Id. at 1200.
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C. Separation of Powers Principles
1. The Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches
An equally important constitutional principle is the notion of sepa-
ration of powers, perhaps most often implicated in considering the inter-
play between the judicial and legislative branches of government. Two of
the cases analyzed in this issue touch on separation of powers principles:
United States ex rel. Holmes v. Consumer Insurance Group31 and Hall v.
Unum Life Insurance Co. of America.
32
In Holmes, the en banc court considered whether a federal em-
ployee, who was participating in an ongoing governmental investigation
of fraud pursuant to her job duties, was a proper qui tam plaintiff under
the False Claims Act.33 The majority concluded in the affirmative, invok-
34ing the "plain meaning" rule of statutory construction. As numerous
commentators have observed, this principle of statutory construction
furthers separation of powers values by "constraining" a court's ability to
go beyond the statute's plain meaning. 35 The dissent, on the other hand,
concluded that the government employee in question was not a proper
qui tam plaintiff.36 The dissent reached this conclusion based in part on
the principle of statutory construction under which federal courts must
strictly construe jurisdictional statutes.37 This cannon of statutory con-
struction similarly serves to maintain the balance of power between the
federal courts and Congress set forth in Article Ill, Section 2 of the Con-
38stitution.
In Hall, we considered the scope of our evidentiary review in an
Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") case.39 The ques-
tion presented was the circumstances, if any, in which a district court
may supplement the administrative record in considering an employee-
beneficiary's challenge to a plan-administrator's benefits determina-
tion.40 After acknowledging Congress' agency-like setup in the context
31. 318 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
32. 300 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2002).
33. Holmes, 318 F.3d at 1200-02.
34. Id. at 1209.
35. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1, 73 &
n.303 (1993) (citing cases that make the argument). The dissent in Holmes also relied on the plain
meaning rule. See Holmes, 318 F.3d at 1209 (Tacha, C.J., dissenting) ("To determine a statute's
plain meaning, '[we] must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language
and design of the statute as a whole."' (quoting Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 208 F.3d 871,
878 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
36. Holmes, 318 F.3d at 1221 (Tacha, C.J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 1216 (Tacha, C.J., dissenting) ("[We must strictly construe statutes conferring
jurisdiction, resolving any doubts against jurisdiction.").
38. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (defining the authority and limits to the authority of the federal
courts).
39. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000). We considered this question in the context of de
novo review. Hall, 300 F.3d at 1201.
40. Hall, 300 F.3d at 1200.
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of employee-benefits decisions under ERISA, we strictly limited the cir-
cumstances in which a district court might supplement the administrative
record.4' That holding could be viewed as an effort to strike the appropri-
ate balance between two competing concerns: avoiding a system in
which federal district courts function as substitute plan administrators
and protecting employees' substantive and procedural rights.
2. The Proper Role of the Appellate Court in the Federal Court Sys-
tem
Although the concept of separation of powers is primarily identified
with the three branches of our federal government, similar principles
operate in defining the proper role of the appellate court in reviewing
district court decisions. For example, appellate courts accord substantial
deference to the district court's role as fact finder, granting the district
court broad discretion in performing this role. The decision in Hall rein-
forced this principle. Similarly, the plain-error doctrine at issue in United
States v. Lujan42 and United States v. Avery,43 both Apprendi44 cases,
serves to minimize instances in which appellate courts disrupt the final
judgments of district courts.45
D. Individual Sovereignty
The final first principle that I will discuss is the concept of individ-
ual sovereignty, the notion that government exists first and foremost not
as an end in itself, but as the protector of individual liberty. The cases in
this survey touch on numerous individual rights, including: First
Amendment freedoms; 46 Fourth Amendment protections against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures;4 7 protection against racial discrimination
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; 48 rights
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; 49 and the
right of incarcerated persons to seek federal habeas corpus relief.50 As
41. Id. at 1202. Specifically, we held that although review of an ERISA benefits decision
should generally be limited to the administrative record, the district court may, in its discretion,
supplement that record when circumstances clearly establish that additional evidence is necessary to
adequately conduct its de novo review. Id.
42. 268 F.3d 965, 967 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming district court's sentencing decision).
43. 295 F.3d 1158, 1182 (10th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court's sentencing decision).
44. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (establishing constitutional requirements
for applying sentencing guidelines that increase the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maxi-
mum).
45. Although the plain-error doctrine primarily seeks to promote the adversary system and
further judicial efficiency, it also serves to protect the finality of district court judgments.
46. Fleming, 298 F.3d at 922.
47. Avery, 295 F.3d at 1164; Herrera, 301 F.3d at 1194.
48. Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2002). The action in
Townsend was based on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which embodies the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1236.
49. Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1192; Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1233.
50. Johnson, 288 F.3d at 1191; Herrera, 301 F.3d at 1193.
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the courts of last resort in most cases, the federal courts of appeal are
vested with the weighty responsibility of defining the contours of these
numerous individual procedural and substantive rights.
In performing this function, it is imperative that federal courts rec-
ognize the manner in which "procedural" rights function to protect "sub-
stantive" rights. Our holding in Townsend v. Lumbermens Mutual Casu-
alty Co.51 aptly illustrates this point. In Townsend, an employment dis-
crimination case, we held that in certain contexts a trial court must in-
struct a jury that they may infer a discriminatory motive if they disbe-
lieve the employer's proffered explanation.52 We recognized the substan-
tial danger of jury confusion, noting that it would be "unreasonable... to
expect that jurors, aided only by the arguments of counsel, will intui-
tively grasp a point of law that until recently eluded federal judges who
had the benefit of such arguments. 53 Securing this procedural right
heightened the protection afforded the substantive right to equal treat-
ment under the law, embodied in the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment 54 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
55
CONCLUSION
The first principles, which animate our work, stand as powerful re-
minders of the great legacy of a government "of the people, by the peo-
ple, and for the people" 56 that we have inherited. In these troubled times
in our country, it is essential that we all-judges, lawyers, and all citi-
zens-be vigilant in protecting and preserving these first principles and
the other cornerstones of this republic. The system of checks and bal-
ances, separation of powers, and protection of individual sovereignty
stand at the heart of our definition of freedom as it has been experienced
in the United States. The judges and staff of the Tenth Circuit are privi-
leged and humbled by the opportunity to serve this nation representing
the Third Branch of government in the six states within the borders of the
circuit. We particularly appreciate the assistance and support we receive
from the law schools in the circuit. We are indebted to the Denver Uni-
versity Law Review for its annual review of our case law. We are hopeful
that students and the public alike will not only read the opinions, but will
also, from time to time, visit the historic courtrooms in the Byron White
51. Townsend, 294 F.3d at 1241.
52. Id. We did not hold that such an instruction was always required. Rather, such an instruc-
tion is required where "a rational finder of fact could reasonably find the defendant's explanation
false and could 'infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up
a discriminatory purpose."' Id.
53. Id. at 1241 n.5.
54. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
55. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2000).
56. President Abraham Lincoln, Address at Gettysburg, Pa. (Nov. 19, 1863), in MORTIMER J.
ADLER & WILLIAM GORMAN, THE AMERICAN TESTAMENT (1975).
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United States Courthouse 7 to be reminded of the lasting legacy of the
rule of law and the more than almost seventy-five years of development
of that law in this circuit.
57. The Byron White United States Courthouse is located at 1823 Stout Street, Denver, Colo-
rado.
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